The transfer benefit to a worker from a day's employment in public works amounts to the wage he gets from the scheme, net of any costs incurred -both the costs of participation (such as the cost of transport) and the earnings lost from alternative employment (Ravallion, 1987; Datt and Ravallion, 1992) . If the costs of participation and income from alternative sources are negligible, and the program has no effect on the labor market and the structure of wages, the transfer benefit approximates to the program wage times the duration of employment. Quite plausibly, the assumptions are unlikely to hold in reality. Unless the scale of the program is very limited, the program is likely to put an upward pressure on the wage rate, thereby reducing the demand for labor. Moreover, the costs of participation and foregone earnings are only rarely zero. Depending upon the impact of the scheme on the wage rate, the foregone earnings, and the costs of participation, the transfer benefit may be higher or lower than the program wage. 1 Apart from the wage rate, the share of wages in total cost, and the duration of employment determine the total transfer benefits going to workers.
One argument advanced is to keep the program wage low so that the poor are selfselected into the program. A low wage rate is most likely to keep the nonpoor out of the program. However, a low wage will also result in lower transfer earnings per (poor) participant. It keeps the overall participation rate low, while at the same time ensuring a disproportionate number of poor participants, than would be the case if the wage rate were higher. Given a budget, a relatively high wage rate is most likely to lead to rationing of jobs under the scheme, apart from attracting nonpoor workers to the program.
The potential income gains from a works program can be exaggerated if the source of financing is ignored. If employment is expanded entirely through an aid-financed public works program, the advantage (transfer benefits) to workers is straight-forward. (Table 2) .
(b) Wage rate and targeting. The wage rate is a key element determining the distributional outcomes of the program. One important way to ensure that the program reaches the poor is to maintain the program wage at a level no higher than the ruling market wage rate for unskilled labor. This practice also helps keep overall costs down. In most countries, governments set the levels for minimum wage for unskilled labor. Though minimum wages are legally binding, their enforcement varies, especially within large countries. Whether the minimum wage is higher or lower than the ruling market wage and whether or not it is enforced, are empirical questions; even in the same country the relationship between the two might vary over time and, in large countries, across regions.
In countries where the market wage is less than the minimum wage, the poor may be selfselected to the program if the program wage is set at a level no higher than the ruling market wage, even if it were lower than the statutory minimum wage. However, political and legal constraints may make it difficult to maintain the program wage at levels less than the minimum wage. Not surprisingly, there is much cross-country variation ( Table 1 ).
The wage rate was set at 70 percent of the minimum wage in Chile; it was about 25 percent higher than agricultural market wages in the Philippines; it was equal to the statutory minimum wage in Kenya. In India, the nationwide program of JRY maintained its wages at the statutory minimum wage, though market wages were much lower than the minimum wage in many regions. In the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) also, the program wage was equal to the minimum wage. But the minimum wage remained lower than the ruling market wage until 1988. In 1988, the minimum wage as well as the program wage were doubled. This upward revision of the wage rate in 1988 contributed to job rationing, thereby eroding the "guarantee" of employment expected of the program (Datt and Ravallion, 1994) . In Tanzania and Botswana, because the program wage rate was maintained at a level higher than it was in comparable unskilled activities, jobs had to be rationed -particularly during droughts when the poor's need for participation in public works was the greatest (Teklu, 1994b) . The program wage in Kenya and the Philippines was also found to be higher than the market wage for unskilled labor; as a result substantial numbers of the nonpoor were attracted to the program (Teklu, 1994a , Subbarao, et. al., 1995 . But in some countries (Burkina Faso, Senegal and Sri Lanka), the program wages were lower than market wages. The lesson: a relatively high wage rate is most likely to result in job rationing. (Dev, 1996) . This small level of job creation is clearly insufficient to raise the incomes of poor families. Nevertheless, the program operated intensively during the agricultural off-peak season: as many as 55 million persons gained employment in the agricultural off-peak seasons. Because of the timing of the program, "consumptionsmoothing" (stabilization) benefits were considerable, despite its other disadvantages. In MEGS also, Walker and Ryan (1990) show that the risk benefits conferred by the scheme are considerable. Although jobs were rationed and the total number of person days of employment sharply declined after the wage rate doubled in 1988, stabilization benefits of the scheme continued as the MEGS operated intensively in off-seasons in both 1980-81 and 1990-91 -see Figure 1 . In Kenya and Tanzania, not only were program wage rates higher but the timing of public works was synchronized with the busy agricultural season, thereby significantly diminishing both the transfer and stabilization benefits to the poor (Teklu, 1994a (Teklu, , 1994b . In Bangladesh, too, the food-for-work program was poorly synchronized with seasonal patterns of need for work and food.
(d) Share of wage cost in total cost. In most programs, the share of wages to total cost of programs varied between 0.3 to 0.6 (Table 2) . While a higher share is desirable for higher transfer benefits to be conferred on the poor, many factors determine this ratio including the nature of the asset to be created, the duration and timing of the works and, most of all, the availability of technically and economically feasible labor-based methods of production. In most road construction activities, the share of wages to total cost ranged between 0.4 to 0.5 percent. Where the work has been entrusted to private contractors, the outcome with respect to the share of wage cost to total cost is unpredictable. Evidence from Ghana suggests that timely availability of project funds is important for the adoption of labor-based methods (Stock and de Veen, 1996) . the delivery mechanism selected; particularly the modalities of hiring private contractors; the wage rate; the capital-intensity of operations; and administrative capacity.
Disaggregated information on the above factors is hard to come by; so it is difficult to disentangle the various factors underlying the variations in cost per job created.
Available data on cost per job created, which belong to late 1980s or early 1990s, are shown in Table 2 . There is much cross-country variation --from as low as $1 The variations in the cost of job created seem to widen when evaluated in PPP exchange rates. Table 3 shows data on annual cost per job created in public works, evaluated at PPP exchange rates in seven countries. The cost appears to be much too high for Senegal and Ghana. 
IV. Conclusions
Three general conclusions can be drawn from the reviewed experience.
First, the level of the wage rate is critical in determining the distribution of benefits from the program, as well as how much of the program is targeted toward the poor.
Maintaining the program wage at the level no higher than the ruling market wage for unskilled labor can enable the poor to self-select themselves into the program.
Second, the timing and duration of employment determine the nature of benefits offered by the program: in general, the more narrowly the program is restricted to operate only during agricultural slack seasons, the lower the transfer benefits and the higher the stabilization benefits. Even if transfer benefits are small, the program's stabilization (risk) benefits can be substantial. However, a public works program entirely for consumptionsmoothing purposes is more appropriate where poverty is transient-the numbers of the vulnerable rising during bad agricultural years and in slack seasons and falling in good years and peak agricultural seasons-than in countries with chronic and severe poverty.
In countries subject to serious interyear fluctuations (e.g., Ethiopia), and in countries where poverty gap ratios are high, the need for rendering the program year-round (thus raising the transfer benefits to the poor) assumes greater importance.
Third, the program can be so designed as to encourage greater participation of women, a higher degree of involvement of the private sector and lower transaction costs for the poor to participate in the program. Source: Compiled from K. Subbarao, et. al. (1996) . Source: Bank staff estimates, as cited in K. Subbarao, et. al. (1996). 14-A 
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